comment by Jerry Gordon

Global View by Bret Stephens, The Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2008

The violent protests in Tibet that began last week and have since spread across (and beyond) China are frequently depicted as a secessionist threat to Beijing. But the regime’s deeper problem in the current crisis is neither ethnic nor territorial. It’s religious.
[God and Man in China]
Lhasa, March 14. The banner reads: “Enhancing Public Safety Management, Safeguarding Political Stability.”

If there’s a template for Beijing’s policy on religion, it’s the “Invasion of the Body Snatchers.” In 1995, the regime effectively kidnapped Gendun Choekyi Nyima, a 6-year-old boy named by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, the second-highest ranking figure in Tibetan Buddhism. In Nyima’s place, Beijing designated its own “official” Panchen Lama, the slightly younger Gyaltsen Norbu. Nyima’s whereabouts, assuming he’s alive, are unknown. More recently, a new set of “implementation regulations” on Tibetan religious affairs has come into force, drastically curtailing the freedom of monks and nuns to travel within China, and introducing political themes into the qualification exams required of religious initiates. Of the roughly 100 Tibetan political prisoners, fully three-quarters are monks or nuns.

Much the same goes with China’s Christians. The regime has substituted its own Catholic hierarchy — the Catholic Patriotic Association — for Rome’s since 1957, leading to endless friction between the Pope and the Communist Party. Similarly, Chinese Protestantism officially operates under the so-called “Three-Self Patriotic Movement” (the three “selfs” being self-governance, self-support and self-propagation), which in turn is regulated by the party. “The purpose of [the regime’s] nominal degree of sympathy for Christianity is to indoctrinate and mobilize for Communist Party objectives,” says journalist David Aikman, author of the 2003 book “Jesus in Beijing.” “I’ve often joked that the most leftist people in China are members of the Three-Self Church.”

The method here is not subtle. The regime banned religion — one of the so-called Four Olds — during the Cultural Revolution. Once it figured out that that didn’t work, it sought instead to turn clergy into bureaucrats, and replace the idea of the divine with the mechanics of political control. The results have been, at best, a partial success. There are now some six million “Catholics” who adhere to the state-approved dogma, along with another 20 million or so “official” Protestants, whose activities are overseen by a director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs. As for Tibetan Buddhists, those who venerate the state-approved Panchen Lama can probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.

By contrast, the number of underground Catholics faithful to the Vatican easily equals the number of official ones. Unofficial Protestants, who attend unsanctioned “house churches,” are said to number anywhere between 70 million and 130 million; one prominent Chinese pastor puts the count closer to 400 million. That latter figure is probably exaggerated, but there’s no question that Christianity of the unofficial kind is winning Chinese converts in huge numbers. Not only that, it’s winning them among every class of Chinese: farmers, urban migrant workers, professionals and intellectuals.

What is the appeal of Christianity to so many Chinese — or, for that matter, of Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, the old-time peasant religions and the newfangled Falun Gong? In “smashing” organized religion, Mao Zedong also destroyed the traditional institutions of charity and social support that used to provide succor to the lonely and the needy. Now that succor is desperately in demand, and the churches are there to meet it. (Continue Reading this Article)